Major scuffles between India and China have broken out since May 5 along the LAC (Line of Actual Control), Naku La in Sikkim, and Galwan in Ladakh. Face-off points between Indian Army and the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) in Eastern Ladakh such as Pangong Tso, Hot Springs and Galwan River stand disputed.
The Modi Government and the military forces have gone into ‘denial’ and looking for perception building to soothe diplomatic acquiescence. According to several reports, PLA has secured approximately 40-60 sq. kms of Indian territory. China sits at a position of strength and could lay down unacceptable demands in the Lieutenant-level talks scheduled on June 6 at Chushul-Moldo border meeting point on the Chinese side.
Let us understand the reason for such border skirmish. For the convenience of the readers, I have used a map to explain the conflict in a more detailed manner.
Pangong Area
The points marked as F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, and F8 are known as ‘Fingers’. In 1962, the Indian Army used to hold Sirijap as you can see in F7 and F8. However, it was captured by the PLA in 1962. The LAC runs west to it at Finger 8 on to Ane La Pass. The ITBP (Indo Tibetan Border Police) used to patrol up to Finger 8 and PLA until Finger 4. The Chinese claim in the areas was up to Finger 4. The ITBP established a new post at Finger 3 by constructing a road. PLA called this a violation of border management agreements and started blocking the patrols of ITBP between Finger 4 and Finger 8. In early May this year, PLA moved regular troops and physically secured the areas between Finger 4 and Finger 8. The areas secured provide the PLA forces with immense tactical advantage due to the heights of the peaks, ranging anywhere from 4800-5200 meters. The total area captured is estimated to be around 40-60 sq. kms.
Galwan Area
The heights at North and South of the Galwan River have been secured and there are high chances that reserve battalions have been dispatched to take control of the surrounding areas as well. The estimated distance across the LAC is 3-4 kms on the Indian side. However, the area captured is significantly lesser than the Pangong area but the strategic advantage is immense. These posts overlook the Galwan River valley that is very crucial from Indian point of view.
Hot Springs
PLA forces have proceeded forward with a battalion and has refused any access to the Kongka La Pass. Any development project surrounding the pass by the Indian side stands affected due to this move by the PLA.
In the Netflix documentary China Hustle, fraud-hunting investor Carson Block explains the Chinese proverb- “In clear water, you catch no fish”. China has followed the proverb by carrying out clandestine activities on the border. What is a better time when the whole world is down due to a global pandemic and economic recession is knocking on the door?However, Indian forces are following the ‘No Blinking, No Brinkmanship’ policy in these tough times.
Security and Foreign Policy analysts believe that this move has far-reaching outcomes than just strategic advantage. China seems to follow the policy of ‘Killing the Chicken to Scare the Monkey’. Relatively smaller powers like India and Australia who have aligned themselves with the U.S. are witnessing a more aggressive China. This diplomatic segregation was further triggered by the completion of a road in the Galwan sector of Ladakh that is a part of an infrastructural project to develop the remote areas.
After the Sino-India war, both the countries signed five bilateral agreements and protocols to ensure peace in the conflicted region. (a) 1993 Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China border areas; (b) 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC; (c) 2005 Protocol on Modalities for the implementation of the Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC; (d) 2012 Agreement on the establishment of a working mechanism for consultation and coordination on India-China Border Affairs; and (e) 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement. However, tensions have mounted and led to several stand-offs and conflicts- in Sumdorong Chu in 1987, Depsang in 2013, Chumar in 2014, Doklam in 2017, and now in Galwan River valley.
Xi Jinping visited Modi in October last year. In February, Trump arrived. India stepped up its participation in the U.S. led Indo-Pacific Group of Nations with several other countries like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and Vietnam. India established several diplomatic channels with the U.S. for weekly calls on pandemic preparation and vital supply chains. In addition, Trump’s G7 expansion plan is a brilliant geo-political calculation against China. An alliance of powerful democratic regimes provides an ideological challenge to China and they know this.
Another important point to take note of is India’s relations with Australia. Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison just concluded their first virtual India-Australia summit meeting. Given the immense progress by both the nations in diplomatic relations, both the leaders decided to elevate their Strategic Partnership Status to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). India and Australia signed around nine agreements- the Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo- Pacific; Arrangement concerning Mutual Logistics Support (MLSA); an MOU on cooperation in the field of mining and processing of “critical and strategic” minerals; and the Implementing Arrangement concerning cooperation in Defense Science and Technology to the MOU on Defense Cooperation. Security experts believe that the language of the joint statements somehow reflect shared concerns about China.
The last nail in the coffin was New Delhi’s policy change to lure 1000 companies to relocate from China to India. The government has been repetitively asking for more access to the Chinese markets that is evident from the fact that India is at a trade deficit of approximately $50 bln. This diplomatic, military, and trade policy changes has snubbed China and this might be the reason for its full-throttle action at the LAC.
High-level talks are underway and Lt. Gen. Harinder Singh will represent Indian Army at the Lieutenant-level talks on June 6. Let us hope for the best and prepare for the worst.
P.S. – Due to paucity of geographical information on the subject, this article closely relates to the analysis provided by Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R)on this matter.
By-
Yug Sinha
REFERENCES
- LT GEN H S Panag (RETD), ‘India’s Fingers have come under Chinese boots. Denial won’t help us’, ThePrint, 4 June 2020, available at https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-fingers-have-come-under-chinese-boots-denial-wont-help-us/435145/.
- Ben Westcott and Vedika Sood, ‘Indian defense minister says there have been ‘significant’ Chinese troop movements amid border tensions’, CNN, 5 June 2020, available at https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/04/india/china-india-border-standoff-intl-hnk/index.html.
- Manjeet Singh Negi, ‘Lt Gen Harinder Singh: Meet the officer who will represent Army at crucial India-China border tensions meeting’, India Today, 4 June 2020, available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/lt-gen-haridner-singh-indian-army-china-pla-ladakh-border-lac-standoff-meeting-1685552-2020-06-04.
- Archana Chaudhary, ‘India’s China standoff shows risks of getting too close to Donald Trump’, Economic Times, 5 June 2020, available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-china-standoff-shows-risks-of-getting-too-close-to-donald-trump/articleshow/76208093.cms.
- Prathamesh Mulye, ‘India’s new aversion to Chinese investment will hurt its own businesses’, QUARTZ INDIA, 5 June 2020, available at https://qz.com/india/1863245/restrictions-on-chinese-fdi-may-hurt-indian-companies/.
- Seshadri Chari, ‘Ahead of talks with China, question for India: Settle geography or wait for history to unfold?’, ThePrint, 5 June 2020, available at https://theprint.in/opinion/ahead-of-talks-with-china-question-for-india-settle-geography-or-wait-for-history-to-unfold/435955/.
- Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (Retd.), ‘India-China LAC Standoff: Top military commanders to meet for early resolution’, Financial Express, 5 June 2020, available at https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/india-china-lac-standoff-top-military-commanders-to-meet-for-early-resolution/1982178/.
- Ikram Sehgal, ‘India’s (Possible) China war?’, Daily Times, 5 June 2020, https://dailytimes.com.pk/621974/indias-possible-china-war/.
- Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘India Expands Diplomatic Efforts Amid Border Standoff With China’, THE DIPLOMAT, 5 June 2020, available at https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/india-expands-diplomatic-efforts-amid-border-standoff-with-china/.
- Sridhar Kumaraswami, ‘India, Australia ink pact to counter China’, DECCAN CHRONICLE, 5 June 2020, avaiThe ‘gloves are off’ at the LAC